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MEETING THE LOCALITY REQUIREMENT OF GENERAL 
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND OF BEING ENGAGED IN 
MARITIME EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE LONGSHORE AND HARBOR 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT. 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that appellant did not 
satisfy the locality prong for general admiralty jurisdiction and affirmed the 
district court's grant of summary judgment because appellant was not 
engaged in maritime employment as required under the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 
Scott v. Trump Indiana, Inc. 
United State Count of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
337 F.3d 939 
(Decided July 28, 2003) 
Plaintiff Russell Scott ("Scott") and his wife Lauren Scott filed complaints under 
the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. §688), the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 
("LHWCA") (33 U.S.C. § 905), and under general admiralty jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. 
§ 1333) as a result of a serious injury Scott sustained while standing on a pier at 
Buffington Harbor, Indiana. At the time Scott sustained this injury he was under the 
employ of, and on an assignment for Total Marine Safety Center ("Total Marine"). Total 
Marine had a contract with Trump Indiana, Inc. ("Trump") to install, design, and 
maintain the lifesaving equipment required by the United States Coast Guard, on board 
the vessel Trump Casino. A portion of Scott's employment at Total Marine consisted of 
developing a training course on the deployment of life rafts and, should the need arise, 
the safe evacuation of ships. Scott administered this course to Total Marine clients, 
including staff from the Trump Casino. 
On the day of the injury, April 4, 1997, Scott was present at Buffington Harbor to 
observe a Coast Guard required life raft drill aboard the Trump Casino. While observing 
the drill, Scott spent time both onboard the vessel and on land. At no time during this 
drill did Scott spend time on the life raft itself. After the raft was inflated and deployed . 
into the water, it was towed to an auxiliary pier. At this pier it was supposed to be lifted 
out of the water so that it could be transported to Total Marine for inspection and 
repackaging. 
Since the Trump Casino was not equipped with an onboard crane, Total Marine 
made a contract with Lola Crane to provide a hydraulic truck crane and a crane operator 
for the purpose of lifting the raft out of the water. When the raft reached the auxiliary 
pier, Total Marine employees aboard the raft attached the crane to it. At this point, Scott 
was standing on the auxiliary pier. As the raft was being lifted out of the water and 
across the pier, it swayed due to a gust of wind. The raft then hit Scott in the head, 
causing severe internal head injuries and swelling, which required a craniotomy. 
Scott and his wife ("appellants") filed claims against Total Marine under the 
Jones Act, against Trump under the LHWCA, and against Lola Crane, as well as the 
operator of the crane, Mark Nichols, under general maritime jurisdiction. The district 
court granted summary judgment against the appellants on all the claims. As to the claim 
against Total Marine, the court found that appellants did not state any allegations of fact 
that could establish jurisdiction under the Jones Act. Trump was granted summary 
judgment as the court held that, assuming Scott was covered by the LHWCA, there was 
no evidence of any negligence by the personnel of the Trump Casino. Finally, in 
dismissing the claims against Lola Crane and Nichols, the court found that appellants did 
not satisfy the requirements of federal admiralty jurisdiction. Appellants appealed the 
district court's ruling on the LHWCA and general admiralty claims. 
The Seventh Circuit first looked to appellants' claim under general admiralty 
jurisdiction. It reviewed the district court's decision that subject matter jurisdiction did 
not exist de novo, and the court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. 
First, the court looked to the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740, 
which provides "the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend 
to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on 
navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on 
land." The court then enunciated the two-part test that was formulated by courts in 
response to the aforementioned act to determine if general admiralty jurisdiction exists in 
cases involving tort claims. According to the test, a party seeking to use federal 
admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim has to meet conditions of both location and a 
connection or nexus with maritime activity. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co. , 5 13 U.S. 527, 534 ( 1995). The location prong determines whether 
the tort occurred on navigable waters, or whether the injury suffered on land was caused 
by a vessel on navigable water. 46 U.S.C. § 740. The connection or nexus prong has two 
components (1), whether the incident in question has a "potentially disruptive effect on 
maritime commerce;" and (2), "whether the general character of the activity giving rise to 
the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity." Weaver v. 
Hollywood Casino-Aurora, Inc. , 255 F.3d 379, 382 (7th Cir. 2001). 
The court first focused on the location prong. Since the accident did not occur on 
navigable water, the court stated that in order for this prong to be satisfied, the accident 
had to have been proximately caused by the vessel. Significantly, for the purposes of the 
locality test, the court stated that an appurtenance to a vessel is considered part of the 
vessel itself. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535. Accordingly, the court focused its attention on 
whether Scott's injury was caused by an appurtenance to the Trump Casino. 
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The appellants contended that their case was analogous to Gutierrezz v. Waterman 
Steamship Corp. , 373 U.S. 206 ( 1963), where jurisdiction was found to exist under the 
Extension Act. Gutierrez involved a longshoreman who was injured when he slipped on 
loose beans that had leaked out of a cargo container which had been unloaded from a 
ship. The Supreme Court found that the cargo container constituted a part of the ships 
"gear." !d. at 2 15 (In a later case, Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 2 10- 1 1  
( 1971), the court classified Gutierrez as turning on the point that the injury was caused by 
an appurtenance to the ship). Before stating its holding, the Seventh Circuit looked to 
other decisions, namely Victory Carriers and Anderson v. United States, 3 17 F.3d 1235 
( 11th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff in Victory Carriers was injured on a pier while 
transporting cargo, with a forklift, to a location where it was to be loaded onto a vessel. 
The forklift's overhead protection rack carne loose and injured the plaintiff; however, the 
forklift was owned by the plaintiffs stevedore employer. The court declined to expand 
jurisdiction to encompass " ... pier side accidents caused by a stevedore's pier-based 
equipment." !d. at 204. The Eleventh Circuit in Anderson found that a fighter jet was an 
appurtenance to the USS John F. Kennedy because it was assigned to and housed on the 
ship, personnel aboard the ship controlled its operations, and at the time of the accident, 
the jet was carrying out the Kennedy's mission. Anderson, 317 F.3d at 1238. The court, 
in reaching its decision set forth a definition of an appurtenance: "any specifically 
identifiable item that is destined for use aboard a specifically identifiable vessel and is 
essential to the vessel's navigation, operation, or mission. !d. 
The court held that neither the crane nor the life raft were appurtenances to the 
Trump Casino. The court, in deciding that the crane was not an appurtenance, relied 
heavily on the definition of an appurtenance set forth in Anderson. Notably, the crane 
was never onboard the Trump Casino; it was never under the control of any personnel of 
the vessel; it was not attached to the vessel. Finally, Scott's injury did not occur onboard 
the vessel. According to the court, the crane was similar to the forklift in Victory 
Carriers. Much like the court in Victory Carriers, the Seventh Circuit refused to enlarge 
admiralty jurisdiction to include a "pier side accident caused by a pier-based piece of 
equipment that was not owned or operated by a vessel or its crew." 
Likewise, the court determined that the raft was not an appurtenance. Although 
the life raft was part of the "gear" of the Trump Casino, the court found more influential 
the fact that at the time of Scott's injury, the raft was not under the control of any 
personnel of the Trump Casino. Instead, at that time, the raft was under the control of 
Lola Crane and Nichols. Therefore, because, at the time of the accident the raft was not 
under the control of personnel of the Trump Casino, it could no longer be considered an 
appurtenance to the vessel. Finally, the court noted that even if the raft were to be 
considered an appurtenance, the claim would still fail because appellants did not allege, 
and the facts of the case do not demonstrate, that the raft caused Scott's injury. 
Because the locality prong was not satisfied, the court did not address the nexus 
prong. Having decided that neither the crane nor the raft were appurtenances to the 
Trump Casino, the court held that there could be no general admiralty jurisdiction. The 
court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and dismissed the claims 
against Lola Crane and Nichols for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The court conducted a brief analysis of the appellants' claims under the LHWCA. 
From the court's point of view, the crucial language of this act was that a plaintiff is not 
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covered under the LHWCA unless he was involved in maritime employment. (33 U.S.C. 
§ 903(3) (coverage portion of the LHWCA)). To aid in addressing this threshold 
requirement, the court looked to Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414 (1985). The 
Supreme Court, in Herb's Welding, interpreted the congressional intent of the language to 
cover workers on the site who are engaged in the vital elements of loading and unloading, 
but not all those that are engaged in the overall process of loading or unloading. !d. at 
423. The Supreme Court also stated that although maritime employment is not limited to 
the positions listed in §903(3), it also cannot be read to eliminate the requirement of 
establishing a connection to the loading or construction of ships. Herb's Welding 470 
U.S. at 423. 
First, the court evaluated the largely passive nature of Scott's employment as 
Director of Training for Total Marine. Next, the court looked to the record and 
emphasized that Scott was not involved in the safety drill at all, but at most, was an 
observer. The court then evaluated these findings in light of the restrictive reading of 
§903(3) that was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Herb's Welding. As a result, the 
court concluded that Scott was not engaged in maritime employment, thus rendering 
appellants outside the scope of the LHWCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment. 
Sean Connery 
Class of 2005 
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